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On 14 and 15 November 2007, Alain Durré, Huw Pill and Diego Rodriguez-Palenzuela of the ECB’s 
Monetary Policy Stance Division organised a central bank workshop titled “The Analysis of the Money 
Market: Role, Challenges and Implications from the Monetary Policy Perspective”. This workshop 
provided an opportunity for participating central bank experts to exchange views and foster debate, also 
in interaction with international organizations and academic institutions. The first day of the workshop 
addressed issues related to the macro-perspective of the money market, drawing on the experiences of a 
large number of countries. The second day adopted a micro-perspective on the money market, looking 
in particular at trading behaviour in the overnight money market and its implications for the evolution 
of spreads. 
 
A first version of this paper was presented at this workshop. The papers presented at the time of the 
workshop did not consider the potential implications of the financial turmoil for the results of the 
paper, given that the tensions in money markets emerged in August 2007. The published version of 
these papers represents an update of the original paper, which incorporates the discussion which took 
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The phrase “liquidity effect” was introduced by Milton Friedman (1969) to describe the 
first of three effects on interest rates caused by an exogenous change in the money 
supply. The lack of empirical support for the liquidity effect using monthly and quarterly 
data using various monetary and reserve aggregates led Hamilton (1997) to suggest that 
more convincing evidence of the liquidity effect could be obtained using daily data – the 
daily liquidity effect. This paper investigates the implications of the daily liquidity effect 
for Friedman’s liquidity effect using a comprehensive model of the Fed’s daily operating 
procedure. The evidence indicates that it is no easier to find convincing evidence of a 
Friedman’s liquidity effect using daily data than it has been using lower frequency data. 
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Non-technical summary 
The phrase “liquidity effect” was introduced by Milton Friedman (1969) to describe the 
first of three effects on interest rates caused by an exogenous change in the money 
supply. Specifically, it is the idea that, all other things the same, an increase in the supply 
of credit due to a Federal Reserve engineered change in the money supply would initially 
cause interest rates to fall. Despite the widespread belief that the Fed and other central 
banks can control interest rates by altering the supply of credit in the market researchers 
were unable to find empirical evidence of a statistically significant and economically 
relevant liquidity effect using a variety of monetary and reserve aggregates using monthly 
or quarterly data. The failure to find empirical evidence of the liquidity effect was 
attributed to a variety of technical issues associated with the tests that were commonly 
used. Jim Hamilton (1997) suggested that one could obtain an estimate of the liquidity 
effect by estimating the liquidity effect using daily data, i.e., by estimating the “daily 
liquidity effect.” Specifically, Hamilton estimated the response of the federal funds rate 
to shocks to the supply of reserves that he estimated with a model of the Treasury’s 
balance at the Fed. Thornton (2001) noted that the forecast errors that Hamilton estimated 
were not necessarily the same as the forecast errors that the Fed made each day in 
was negatively correlated with his forecast errors could not be taken as evidence of a 
daily liquidity effect. Thornton also noted that Hamilton only found evidence of the daily 
liquidity effect on “settlement Wednesday”—the day when the federal funds rate is more 
volatile because banks have to meet their reserve requirements. Subsequent analyses by  
Carpenter and Demiralp (2006) and Thornton (2007) investigate these aspects of 
Thornton’s analysis is more detail. 
The current paper extends the literature on the daily liquidity effect by showing exactly 
what conditions have to be met in order for evidence of a daily liquidity effect to be 
liquidity effect. Specifically, I show that the daily liquidity effect is directly linked to the 
on banks. I then use a detailed model of the Fed’s daily operating procedure to (1) 
Fed’s reserve requirements, and changes in reserve requirements over time, on the 
relationship between the daily and policy-relevant liquidity effects. 
Estimates of the model using data before 1994 suggest that there may have been a 
statistically significant policy-relevant liquidity effect. The estimated daily liquidity 
effect is small—it would take a $10 billion reserve supply shock to generate about a 20-
basis-point change in the funds rate.  Given that the average effective reserve requirement 
during this period was about 10 percent, a $10 billion reserve supply shock would be 
equivalent to a $100 billion shock in the money supply. Such a shock would be extremely 
large historically. Beginning in 1994 a large number of banks began sweeping deposits 
that were subject to reserve requirements into deposits that were not. These so-called 
In addition, in July 1998 the Fed virtually eliminated any relationship between the daily 
sweep accounts effectively eliminated reserve requirements for a large number of banks. 
considered as evidence of the liquidity effect defined by Friedman—the policy-relevant
estimate the daily liquidity effect and (2) to analyze the effect of specific aspects of the
Friedman’s policy-relevant liquidity effect by reserve requirements that the Fed imposes
implementing monetary policy. Hence, the fact that the actual change in the interest rate6
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and policy-relevant liquidity effects by reinstating lagged reserve accounting. There is 
still a statistically significant daily liquidity effect after 1998 owing to the fact that 
reserve demand is interest sensitive even if there is no contemporaneous relationship 
between reserve demand and money demand. However, estimates of a statistically 
significant daily liquidity effect after July 1998, reported here and elsewhere, have no 
implications for the policy-relevant liquidity effect. The analysis presented here suggests 
that it is no easier to find convincing proof of a statistically significant and economically 
important policy-relevant liquidity effect using high-frequency daily data than it has been 
using lower frequency (monthly and quarterly) data.  A resolution of the liquidity puzzle 
remains elusive.  7
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1. Introduction 
The phrase “liquidity effect” was first used by Milton Friedman (1969) to describe the 
first of three effects on interest rates caused by an exogenous change in the supply of 
money.
1  I refer to Friedman’s liquidity effect as the policy-relevant liquidity effect. 
Despite its prominent role in conventional theories of the monetary policy transmission 
mechanism, there has been very little evidence of a statistically significant or 
economically meaningful liquidity effect.
2  Suggesting that previous attempts to identify 
the liquidity effect have been unsuccessful because low frequency data necessarily mixes 
together the effects of policy on economic variables with the effects of economic 
variables on policy, Hamilton (1997) sought to develop a “more convincing measure of 
the liquidity effect” by estimating the response of the federal funds rate to exogenous 
reserve supply shocks using daily data, i.e., by estimating the daily liquidity effect.  
Thornton (2001a) showed that the estimated daily liquidity effect that Hamilton reported 
was the consequence of a few extreme observations and that there was no evidence of a 
daily liquidity effect using Hamilton’s model and methodology for sample periods prior 
to and after Hamilton’s.  Recently, Carpenter and Demiralp (2006) report evidence of a 
daily liquidity effect using a more complete model of the operating procedure of the 
Trading Desk of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (hereafter, Desk) than that used 
by Hamilton and using a reserve supply shock measure that more adequately reflects 
reserve supply shocks that occur each day in conduct of open market operations. 
1 The other two are called the “income” and “price expectation” or “inflation expectation” effects (e.g., 
Friedman, 1969; and Gibson, 1970a,b).  These effects have roots in classical economics (e.g., Humphrey, 
1983a,b).  Because of the inflation expectation effect, an exogenous change in money growth eventually 
leads to higher, rather than lower, equilibrium nominal interest rates. 
2 The empirical literature on the liquidity effect dates back at least to Cagan and Gandolfi (1969) and 
Gibson (1970a,b).  8
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While they Carpenter and Demiralp (2006) claim their results have implications 
for the policy-relevant liquidity effect, neither their model nor Hamilton’s (1997) 
explicitly models the structural relationship that link the daily and policy-relevant 
liquidity effects.  This paper fills this gap by analyzing the relationship between the daily 
and policy-relevant liquidity effects using a comprehensive model of the Desk’s 
operating procedure.  The analysis shows that because of specific features in the Desk’s 
operating procedure, the Fed’s system of reserve requirements, and other factors, the 
relationship between the daily liquidity effect and the policy-relevant liquidity effect is 
neither simple nor direct. 
The model is estimated using Carpenter and Demiralp’s reserve shock measure.  
The empirical evidence suggests that it is no easier to find convincing evidence of a 
policy-relevant liquidity effect using high-frequency daily data than it has been using 
monetary and reserve aggregates at the monthly or quarterly frequencies. 
The remainder of the paper is divided into three sections.  Section 2 investigates 
the relationship between the daily liquidity effect and the liquidity effect relevant for 
monetary policy using a detailed model of the Desk’s operating procedure.  Section 3 
estimates the model developed in Section 2 using daily data and Carpenter and 
Demiralp’s reserve supply shock measure.  The conclusions are presented in Section 4. 
2. The Policy-Relevant and Daily Liquidity Effects 
Milton Friedman (1969) termed the first of three effects of an exogenous change 
in the supply of money on nominal interest rates the “liquidity effect.”  Friedman’s 
liquidity effect is what economists have in mind when they discuss the liquidity effect. 
Hence, this is the liquidity effect that is relevant for monetary policy, i.e., the policy-9
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relevant liquidity effect. The policy-relevant liquidity effect stems directly from the 
demand for money, i.e.,
(1) (, )
d
tt t M fiy   ,
where
d
t M  denotes the demand for money, which, for purposes of illustration, is a simple 
function of a nominal interest rate,  , and nominal income,  t i t y .  Because individuals 
economize on their holding of money when interest rates rise,  /0 fi ww .
Equilibrium requires that the supply of money, 
s
t M  (which, for simplicity, is 
assumed to be exogenously controlled by the Fed) equals demand, i.e., 
(2) ( , )
s
tt t M fiy   .
The policy-relevant liquidity effect is the initial effect of an exogenous change in the 




t di dM f i
  w w )
                                                
where it is assumed that neither nominal income nor inflation expectations respond 
immediately to the Fed’s actions.  Friedman (1969) called (3) the “liquidity effect.” 
Vast empirical evidence indicates that the demand for money is negatively related 
to the interest rate and is interest inelastic.  This implies that a small exogenous change in 
the supply of money should cause a relatively large response in interest rates. That is, the 
policy-relevant liquidity effect should be relatively large and statistically significant.
Consequently, the inability of researchers to find a statistically significant and 
economically meaningful liquidity effect is referred to as the “liquidity puzzle.”
3
Among other things, the failure to find evidence of the liquidity effect using low 
3 See Strongin (1995). 10
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frequency monetary and reserve aggregates has been attributed to the response of 
nominal income or inflation expectations to money supply shocks or to the inability of 
researchers to isolate exogenous monetary shocks.  Researchers have attempted to 
overcome these problems using, among other things, structural vector autoregressions 
(SVARs).  The recursive SVAR, or RSVAR, has been particularly popular in this 
literature.  SVAR models have been estimated using a variety of monetary and reserve 
aggregates.  Pagan and Robertson (1995) show that it is difficult to find convincing 
evidence of a liquidity effect with these models.
4
The failure of researchers to generate evidence of a statistically significant and 
empirically relevant liquidity effect using monthly or quarterly data led Hamilton (1997) 
to suggest that the failure of the RSVAR approach likely stems from the fact that it 
“claims to uncover…innovations in Fed policy, defined as a change in a policy variable 
that is deliberately induced by Federal Reserve actions that could not have been 
anticipated on the basis of earlier available information.”  Hamilton suggested that 
changes in Fed policy are frequently due to information about “current or future values of 
output, inflation, exchanges rate, or other magnitudes,” so that “the correlation between 
such a ‘policy innovation’ and the future level of output of necessity mixes together the 
effect of policy on output with the effect of output forecasts on policy.”
5  He suggested 
that the liquidity effect could be more easily identified by estimating the response of the 
                                                
4 The exception is using RSVAR with nonborrowed reserves as the monetary aggregate. Coleman, Gilles 
and Labadie (1996) pointed out, however, that evidence of a liquidity effect using nonborrowed reserves 
may be a consequence of the Desk’s efforts to offset the effect of changes in discount window borrowing.  
Thornton (2001b) confirmed this by showing that the estimated liquidity effect using nonborrowed reserves 
is a consequence of the interest sensitivity of discount window borrowing and Desk’s operating procedure 
under either monetary aggregate or funds rate targeting.  He shows that this “liquidity effect” using 
nonborrowed reserves vanishes in the early 1980s when borrowing declined dramatically and became 
relatively interest insensitive. 
5 Hamilton (1997), p. 80. 11
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funds rate reserve supply shocks measured at the daily frequency.  Specifically, he 
estimated reserve supply shocks from a simple time-series model of the Treasury’s daily 
deposits at the Fed.  Assuming that the errors from this model proxy the reserve supply 
shocks that the Trading Desk of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (hereafter, Desk) 
makes each day in conducting open market operations, Hamilton (1997) estimated the 
response of the federal funds rate to his estimated reserve supply shocks. He referred to 
this as the daily liquidity effect. 
2.1 The Relationship between the Policy-Relevant and Daily Liquidity Effects 
The relationship between the policy-relevant liquidity effect and Hamilton’s daily 
liquidity effect is a consequence of the fact that the Fed imposes reserve requirements on 
components of money.  This creates a direct link between the demand for money—the 
source of Friedman’s liquidity effect—and the demand for reserves—the source of the 
daily liquidity effect. That is, 
(4) ( , )
dd
tt t t R rrM rrf i y    ,
where
d
t R  denotes reserve demand and   denotes the Federal-Reserve-imposed 
percentage reserve requirement.  Because of (4), it is possible to estimate the policy-
relevant liquidity effect by estimating the response of interest rates to an exogenous 
change in the supply of reserves—the daily liquidity effect.  Moreover, since the response 
will be identical whether the shock to reserves is due to an error the Desk makes in 
conducting daily open market operations or is monetary policy-induced exogenous shock 
to reserves, the there is no identification problem as there is using higher level monetary 
aggregates.  It is sufficient to identify a shock to reserve supply from any source. 
rr
It is clear from equation (4) that the relationship between the daily and policy-12
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relevant liquidity effects depends on the Desk’s daily operating procedure, which has 
remained essentially the same since at least the early 1970s and the Fed’s system of 
reserve requirements, which has not. 
The analysis begins with a model of the Desk’s operating procedure.  Each day 
the Desk estimates the quantity of reserves that banks will demand over a maintenance 
period ending every other Wednesday, called settlement Wednesday.
6  The Desk also 
estimates the quantity of reserves that will be supplied if the Desk conducts no open 
market operations that day.
7  If the former estimate exceeds the latter, the operating 
procedure suggests that the Desk add reserves through an open market purchase.  If the 
former is smaller than the latter, the procedure suggests that reserves be drained through 
an open market sale. 
Specifically, the Desk estimates the demand for total reserves, i.e.,  
(5) , 11 1 (, )
dd
tt t t t t E TR E rrf i y E ER     t




t ER  denotes depository institutions’ demand for excess reserves, and Et1 denotes the 
expectation operator conditional on information available before that day’s open market 
operation.
The supply of reserves available each day is given by
(6) ,
s
tt t t TR B BR F OMO    t
                                                
6 Until October 1979 the estimate of demand was conditional on the objective or target for the federal funds 
rate.  From October 1979 to September 1982, the estimate was conditional on the objective for the growth 
rate of the M1 monetary aggregate.  Beginning in September 1982, the Fed claimed that the estimate was 
conditional on an objective for borrowed reserves; however, Thornton (2006) provides evidence from 
FOMC transcripts suggesting that the real objective was the federal funds rate.  Today the objective is 
unquestionably the federal funds rate. 
7 A more detailed analysis of the Desk’s operating procedure can be found in Feinman (1993) and Thornton 
(2001b, 2007). 13
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where t B  denotes the Fed’s holding of government debt prior to that day’s open market 
operation, t BR  denotes bank borrowing at the discount window,   denotes autonomous 
factors that affect reserve supply—currency in circulation, the Treasury’s balance at the 
Fed, the float, etc.—and   denotes the amount of open market purchases or sales 




Each day the Desk estimates the supply of reserves that will be available if the 
Desk conducts no open market operations, i.e,  0 t OMO   .  The Desk essentially knows 
the magnitude of  t B , but must make an estimate the  .  The Desk does not estimate 
borrowing, but rather applies the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) determined 
borrowing assumption, called the initial borrowing assumption (
t F
t IBA ).
9  The estimate of 
reserve supply if the Desk conducts no open market operations is  
(7) , 11
s
tt tt t ET R B EF I B A     t
t
) t
                                                
where  denotes the Desk’s estimate of autonomous factors.  The amount of the 
open market operations suggested by the Desk’s operating procedure—the operating 
procedure-determined open market operation ( )—is given by 
1 t EF 
t OPDOMO
(8) . 11 1 (( , ) ) (
d
tt t tt t t t t O P D O M O Er r f iy EE R B EF I B A       
If  is positive, the procedure directs the Desk to purchase government 
securities; if it is negative, the procedure indicates that securities should be sold. 
t OPDOMO
8 Borrowing (and later the initial borrowing assumption) refers to seasonal plus adjustment borrowing.  
Extended credit borrowing is treated separately, as one of the autonomous factors affecting reserve supply. 
9 The IBA was changed relatively infrequently and, most often, when the funds rate target was changed. 
Thornton (2006) shows that the IBA was last mentioned in discussing monetary policy during a conference 
call on January 9, 1991.  However, it remained part of the Desk’s formal operating procedure until at least 
1996. 14
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If the Desk followed its operating procedure exactly,  tt OMO OPDOMO   .  The 
operating procedure is intended to provide the Desk guidance, however.  Judgment is 
used to conduct each day’s open market operation.  Indeed, over most of the period 
examined here, the Desk almost never followed the operating procedure exactly (e.g., 
Thornton, 2007).  To allow for this fact, let 
(9) , tt OMO OPDOMO k   t
t
where  denotes the amount by which actual open market operations differ from the 
open market operations recommended by the operating procedure.  
t k
Reserve market equilibrium requires that the demand for reserves equals the 
supply, i.e., 
(10) . (, )
d
tt t t t t t rrf i y ER B F BR OMO     




( ,)( )( )( ) .
tt
dd
t t tt t t t t tt t
rrf i y
Er r f iy E R EE R F EF B R I B A k  
 
    
The interest rate that equates the reserve market is the federal funds rate,  t ff , which the 
FOMC has been targeting since 1982.
10  Consequently, the Desk’s expectation of reserve 
demand is conditional on the FOMC’s target for the funds rate.  Consequently, (11) can 





( ,)( )( )( ) .
tt
dd
t t tt t t t t tt t
rrf ff y
rrE f ff y ER E ER F E F BR IBA k  
 
     t
                                                
The daily liquidity effect is given by
10 See Thornton (1988, 2006) for the relevant evidence. 15
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In order to estimate the liquidity effect one must make an assumption about the 
demand for reserves.  Following Hamilton (1997) assume that demand is linear, i.e.,  
(14) ( , ) tt t t t ff fy f f y E DK     ,
where D  and E  are positive fixed parameters and  t K  denotes an i.i.d. random 






(1/ ) [ ( ) ( )
() ( )
tt t t t t t
d
ttt t t t
ff rr rr ff F E F BR IBA
rr y rr y ER E ER k
EE




      
   

 
where ~ denotes the Desk’s estimate of the corresponding parameter or variable. 
2.2 The Role of Reserve Requirements 
It is clear from equation (4) that the relationship between the daily and policy 
relevant liquidity effects also depends on the Fed’s system of reserve requirements.  
There are several factors that are relevant in this regard.  Important among these are 
exogenous and endogenous reductions in reserve requirements. The Fed made two major 
exogenous reductions in reserve requirements during the past two decades. The first 
occurred in December 1990; the second in April 1992.
11
There was also an important endogenous change in effective reserve 
requirements. In 1994 banks began sweeping their retail transactions deposit accounts to 
11 Effective December 13, 1990, the 3 percent reserve requirement on non-transaction liabilities was 
reduced to 1.5 percent for weekly reporters; and effective December 27, 1990, the 1.5 percent reserve 
requirement on non-transaction liabilities was reduced to zero for weekly reporters.  The combined effect 
of these actions reduced required reserves by an estimated $13.2 billion.  While not reported here, these 
changes appear to have had no important effect on the estimates of the daily liquidity effect reported in 
Section 3. There have been numerous other changes in the Fed’s in the percentage reserve requirements 
over the years; however, these were relatively small and of little consequence. 16
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reduce their effective reserve requirement (e.g., Anderson and Rasche, 2001).  The result 
was a significant reduction in effective reserve requirements and a significant rise in the 
number of nonbound banks, i.e., banks that satisfy their reserve requirements with vault 
cash.
12  This change has important consequences for the relationship between the daily 
and policy-relevant liquidity effects because it severs the contemporaneous link between 
money demand and reserve demand for banks that satisfy their reserve requirement with 
vault cash.  This means that estimates of the daily liquidity effect that reflects the 
behavior of nonbound banks have no implication for the policy-relevant liquidity effect.
This is extremely important because reserve demand may be interest sensitive for reasons 
other than the interest sensitivity of money demand. 
Unfortunately, there is no way to identify reserves demanded by bound versus 
nonbound banks. However, in July 1998 the Fed reintroduced lagged reserve accounting.
Beginning with the maintenance period that began on July 30, 1998, there is a full two-
maintenance-period lag in the reserve accounting system, i.e., reserve requirements for 
the current maintenance period are determined by deposit balances held during the 
fourteen-day period two maintenance periods previous.  The re-introduction of lagged 
reserve accounting severs the contemporaneous link between money demand and reserve 
demand for all banks, not simply nonbound banks. Hence, there is no contemporaneous 
relationship between the daily and policy-relevant liquidity effects after July 1998. 
Estimates of the daily liquidity after this date have no implications for Friedman’s policy-
relevant liquidity effect. Hence, contrary to their claim Carpenter and Demiralp’s (2006) 
evidence of a daily liquidity effect after July 1998 has no implications for the policy-
12 See Anderson and Rasche (2001) for more details on the effects of retail sweep programs. 17
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relevant liquidity effect. 
Reserve demand is interest sensitive even when there is no contemporaneous link 
between money demand and reserve demand because banks are required to hold reserves 
and, consequently, have an incentive to economize on their holdings of non-interest-
bearing deposits with the Fed. 
Thornton (2001a) has noted that there was a two-day lag in the Fed’s prior reserve 
accounting system from March 1984 to July 1998.
13  Specifically, a bank’s maintenance-
period reserve requirement was based on deposit balances held two days prior to the end 
of the maintenance period. The lack of a contemporaneously relationship between money 
demand and reserve demand on those days means that evidence of a daily liquidity effect 
on the last two days of the maintenance period has no implication for the policy-relevent 
liquidity effect. 
Analyses by Clouse and Dow (2002) and Bartolini, Bertola, and Prati (2002); 
however, show that reserve demand may be related to money demand on the last two 
days of the maintenance period if individual banks behave optimally with respect to the 
reserve carryover provision.
14  These models do not include the costs of operating such 
procedures.  These costs may be large relative to the cost of satisfying a reserve shortfall 
at the end of the maintenance period through the discount window or some other 
means.
15  Consequently, it is not clear that such intense reserve management—though 
technically feasible—is economically viable.
16  In any event, even if banks behave 
13 From 1968 to March 1984 there was a one-maintenance-period lag in the Fed’s system of reserve 
accounting.
14 I would like to thank Jim Hamilton for pointing out this possibility to me. 
15 For example, the one-day cost of paying a 1-percentage-point premium on a $100 million dollar reserve 
shortfall is $2,739.73. 
16 There is also no direct evidence that banks actually implement such procedures.  Indeed, anecdotal 18
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optimally, the relationship between the daily and policy-relevant liquidity effects would 
be affected by the fact that reserve demand on these days would be affected by the 
carryover provision.  Consequently, the extent to which estimates of the response of the 
funds rate to a reserve supply shock on the last two days of the maintenance period 
provide evidence of the policy-relevant liquidity effect is uncertain. 
The relationship between the daily and policy-relevant liquidity effects also can 
be distorted on days when there are large idiosyncratic shocks to the funds rate.  Thornton 
(2001a) has shown that such distortion can be large on settlement Wednesdays.  Hence, 
special care is taken in estimating the daily liquidity effect on those days. 
The dependent variable in equation (15) is  t ff  and not 
*
tt ff ff  , as in Carpenter 
and Demiralp (2006) or  t ff '  as in Hamilton’s (1997).  It is clear from equation (15) that 
*
tt ff ff   is the appropriate dependent variable if and only if the Desk correctly estimates 
the interest elasticity of money demand, i.e., E E    .
Hamilton (1997) and Carpenter and Demiralp (2006) note that a necessary 
condition for obtaining unbiased estimates of the daily liquidity effect is that reserve 
supply shocks be uncorrelated with shocks to money demand,  t K .  However, equation 





tt ER E ER   tt t rr y rr y D D    —variables not included Hamilton’s (1997) or 
Carpenter and Demiralp’s (2006) models. 
3. Estimates of the Daily Liquidity Effect 
This section estimates the daily liquidity effect based on the model developed in 
evidence from reserve account managers of two very large New York banks in the late 1990s suggests that 
these banks did not rely on such procedures to manage their reserves. 19
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Section 2.  The analysis employs an EGARCH (1, 1) model.  Following Hamilton (1997) 
and Carpenter and Demiralp (2006) the daily liquidity effect is estimated using an 
EGARCH model. The EGARCH model is in the class of autoregressive conditional 
heteroskedastic (ARCH) models developed by Engle (1982), and was introduced by 
Nelson (1991).  The specification takes the general form 
(17) tt ff X t E H   , 1,2,..., tT  
where t X  denotes a 1-by-l vector of l regressors and E  denotes the corresponding l-
by-1 vector of coefficients.  The variance of  t H ,
2
t V , is assumed to be conditionally 
















      ,
where t Z  is a 1-by-  vector of observable variables that determine the evolution of the 
variance and 
m
G  is a corresponding  -by-1 vector of coefficients.  The coefficient  m \
allows for the possibility of asymmetry in the response of shocks to the funds rate.
Because ARCH models account for heteroskedasticity, they produce estimates of E  that 
are generally more efficient than ordinary least squares. 
Figure 1 presents  t ff  and 
*
t ff  over the period January 2, 1986, through January 
20, 2004.  There are a number of volatility clusters typical of ARCH.  Some of these are 
associated with well-defined events, such as the marked increases in volatility associated 
with the 1987 stock market crash (bracketed by the first two vertical lines) and the 
surprise reduction in reserve requirements in 1990 (bracketed by the third and fourth 
vertical lines).  There is also a marked decline in volatility that appears to begin in early 
2000 (denoted by the fifth vertical line), which may be associated with changes in the 20
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FOMC’s disclosure procedures.  Moreover, there are a relatively large number of 
volatility spikes—days when the funds rate changed by a relatively large amount only to 
return to essentially its previous day’s level the next day.  These spikes are often unique 
to the funds rate.  Some are associated with well-known events (e.g., settlement 
Wednesday, and the first and last days of the year, or quarter); others are not.  To account 
for spikes in the funds rate associated with well-known events, following Hamilton and 
Carpenter and Demiralp, dummy variables are used for each of the 10 maintenance 
period days ( , ); for the first and last days of the month, quarter, and year 
( ); for the 15
th day of the month ( ); for the day before 
and after holidays; for the day before and after changes in the funds rate target 
( ); for the month of December ( ); and for the first and second week 
of the maintenance period ( ).
Di 1,2,...,10 i  
,,, , , bom eom boq eoq boy eoy mom
,, , bh ah btar atar dec
1, 2 ww
17  Dummy variables are also included for the period 




18  The error the staff of the Board of Governors makes each day in forecasting 
 is the reserve supply shock and is denoted  . t F miss
19  Separate estimates of the demands 
for required and excess reserves are made by the staffs of the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York and the Board of Governors; however, Board’s estimates are used here. 
Because of the introduction of sweep accounting in January 1994, initially the 
                                                
17 If the 15
th falls on a weekend or a holiday,   takes on the value of 1 on the business day closest to the 
middle of the month. 
mom
18  takes on the value 1 from the first day of the stock market crash, October 19, 1987, through 
December 31, 1987, and zero elsewhere.   takes on the value 1 from the first settlement Wednesday 
affected by the changes, December 13, 1990, through February 28, 1991, and zero elsewhere.  
1987 d
1990 d
19 The Board Staff’s estimate is a proxy because in reality, the staffs of the Board and the New York Fed 
make independent estimates of the autonomous factors.  The Treasury makes an independent estimate of 
one of the factors, namely, its balance at the Fed.  Exactly how these estimates are combined each day in 
conducting open market operations is unclear.  See Thornton (2004) for further details. 21
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model is estimated over sample period January 2, 1986 though December 31, 1993.  
Carpenter and Demiralp found the daily liquidity effect to be nonlinear, being statistically 
significant for large shocks (shocks larger than $1 billion) but not for small shocks 






t miss ) using their criterion.  Because of the two-day lag in the Fed’s system of 
reserve requirements during this period, settlement days are partitioned into the last two 
days of the maintenance period ( ) and all other days ( ). 2 ld 2 nl d
20  Also, because the 
effect of reserve supply shocks on the funds rate will be different on days when the funds 
rate target is changed, dummy variables for days when the target was changed ( )
and other days ( ) are included.  Finally, the Student’s t distribution is used rather 
that the normal distribution to account for the thick tails in the distribution of the funds 
rate.
*
t df f '
*
t dn ff '
The results are presented in Panels A, B, and C for Specification 1 of Table 1.  
The first column of each specification reports the parameter estimate, and the second 
column reports the corresponding significance level of the test that the coefficient is zero.
Panel A reports the estimates of E  for the parameters that are particularly relevant for 
evaluating the daily and policy-relevant liquidity effects.  Panel B reports the estimates 
for the remaining parameters of E .  Panel C reports the estimates of the variance 
parameters and the relevant summary statistics. 
The estimates of the variance parameters in Panel C for Specification 1 show that 
                                                
20 Hamilton and Demrialp partition   by each day of the maintenance period.  However, save the last 
two days of the maintenance period, there is no particular reason to believe that the slope of the money 
demand curve should be systemmaticlly different on different days of the maintenance period. 
Consequently, this is not done here. 
miss22
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the variance increased significantly during the periods immediately following the 1987 
stock market crash and following the 1990 surprise reduction in reserve requirements.  
Also, the estimate of degrees of freedom ( ) is very small, 3.77, and highly 
statistically significant, indicating the appropriateness of using the Student’s t 
distribution.
dof
Panel B reports estimates of the “nuisance” parameters designed to account for 
certain day-specific effects.  All but a few of these estimates are statistically significant.  
In most cases the estimated responses are as one might expect, e.g., the funds rate tends 
to be higher on settlement Wednesdays, higher at the end of the quarter, the first and last 
days of the month, etc. 
Panel A reports the estimates relevant for the daily and policy-relevant liquidity 
effects.  As expected, reserve supply shocks that occur on days when the FOMC changed 
the funds rate target are not statistically significant, regardless of whether the shocks are 
large or small.  Also, consistent with Carpenter and Demiralp (2006), the response of the 
funds rate to small shocks on all but the last two days of the maintenance period is 
statistically significant and smaller than the response to large shocks.  However, the 
magnitude of the difference between the response to large and small shocks is relatively 
small.  Indeed, the likelihood ratio test statistic for equality of the response is  ,
which is not statistically significant.  Hence, there is no evidence of nonlinearity. 
0.464
There is a statistically significant difference in the response of the funds rate on 
the last two days of the maintenance period relative to other days.  Indeed, the response is 
considerably larger, about three times as large. 
The coefficients on  tt BR IBA  t k , ,  and 
D
t err are all statistically significant at very 23
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low significance levels.  The coefficient on  tt BR IBA   is positive, suggesting that 
borrowing above the FOMC’s assumed level is associated with the funds rate above the 
target.  The sign of the coefficient is inconsistent with a supply shock interpretation, but 
is consistent with the evidence that borrowing responds endogenously to the funds rate 
(e.g., Thornton, 2001b).  The coefficients on   and  t k
D
t err  have the anticipated signs.  The 
estimated coefficient on   suggests that the funds rate tends to be significantly lower on 
days when the Desk engages in more open market operations than the operating 
procedure suggests.  Likewise, if the Desk underestimates the demand for reserves, the 
funds rate is somewhat higher.  Note that a positive value of 
t k
D
t err  is conceptually the 
same as a negative reserve supply shock.  Consistent with theory, the estimated 
coefficients on 
D
t err  and   on other than the last two days of the maintenance period 
are similar in magnitude but opposite in sign.  Indeed, the likelihood ratio statistic for the 
hypothesis that the responses are equal but opposite in sign is  .
miss
0.79
Given the lack of statistically significant nonlinearity in the response to shocks, 
the model is re-estimated assuming that there is no difference in the response of the funds 
rate to large or small shocks.  These results are reported in Specification 2 of Table 1.
The estimated coefficients are nearly identical to those reported for Specification 1.
Importantly, the response on the last two days of the maintenance period is three times 
larger than on other days. 
To investigate the sensitivity of the estimates to unusually large, idiosyncratic 
shocks to the funds rate, the observations are partitioned into days when there are large 
idiosyncratic shocks to the funds rate, i.e., outliers (O), and days when there are no 
outliers (NO).  Shocks to the funds rate are estimated by regressing the federal funds rate 24
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on a constant and the 3-month Treasury bill rate over the period.  The residuals from this 
equation represent idiosyncratic movements in the federal funds rate.  As such, the 
response of the funds rate on such days provides no information about a policy-relevant 
liquidity effect.  Outliers are days when the shocks to the funds rate are more than 80 
basis points (roughly two standard errors).
21  There were 62 such days during this sample 
period (slightly more than 3 percent of the days), 33 of which occurred on a settlement 
Tuesday or Wednesday. 
Estimates with the variables partitioned by outliers are reported in Specification 3 
of Table 1.  As anticipated, estimates of the daily liquidity effect are sensitive to 
idiosyncratic shocks to the funds rate.  On days when there are large idiosyncratic shocks 
to the funds rate, the estimated daily liquidity effect is many times larger than on days 
when there are no outliers.  Consistent with the results of Thornton (2001a) estimates of 
the daily liquidity effect on Settlement Wednesdays and other days when there are large 
shocks to the funds rate overestimates the magnitude of both the daily and policy-relevant 
liquidity effects.  The estimate of the daily liquidity effect that is most indicative of the 
policy-relevant liquidity effect is the estimate on other than the last two days of the 
maintenance period when there are no large idiosyncratic shocks to the funds rate.
22  That 
this is the case is supported by the fact that this estimate is nearly equal but opposite in 
                                                
21 As a robustness check on the qualitative results values of 40, 50, and 60 basis points were also used.  The 
qualitative conclusion about the coefficient   on   days is invariant to the value used.    miss NO
22 Given the close relationship between the funds rate and the funds rate target, the model was also 
estimated using 
*
tt ff ff   as the dependent variable.  While the coefficient estimates changed somewhat, the 
qualitative conclusions are not sensitive to whether 
t ff  or 
*
tt ff ff   is the dependent variable.  The 
quantitative and qualitative results are very sensitive to excluding 
tt BR IBA  , , and  , however.  The 





tt BR IBA  ,
D
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sign to the coefficient on reserve demand forecast errors.  Again, the null hypothesis that 
these coefficients are equal and opposite in sign is not rejected.  The likelihood ratio 
statistic is 1.066. 
3.1 Post-1993 Estimates of the Daily Liquidity Effect
The introduction of sweep accounts in January 1994 dramatically reduced reserve 
requirements for banks over time.  Anderson and Rasche (2001) show that sweep activity 
significantly reduced deposit liabilities that were subject to reserve requirements by the 
end of our sample period, December 31, 1996.  They conclude that by the end of 1999 
“the willingness of bank regulators to permit use of deposit-sweeping software has made 
statutory reserve requirements a ‘voluntary constraint’ for most banks.”  To investigate 
the effect of sweep accounts on the estimate of the daily liquidity effect, the model is 
estimated over the period January 3, 1994, through December 31, 1996.  To conserve 
space, only estimates of the parameters that are relevant for the liquidity effect are 
reported in Table 2.  All of the estimated coefficients on the various partitions of 
are much smaller in absolute value than those reported in Table 1.  Moreover, none is 
statistically significant at the 5 percent significance level.  The estimate is statistically 
significant at slightly higher than the 5 percent significance level when   is 
partitioned by   and  .  The estimate is only about half as large as that for the pre-
1994 period, which is inconsistent with expectations given that sweeps effectively reduce 
reserve requirements—all other things the same, lower effective reserve requirements 
should have resulted in a larger coefficient estimate.  One possible explanation is that the 
effective elimination of mandatory reserve requirements for non-bound banks 
significantly altered the interest sensitivity of aggregate reserve demand independent of 
miss
miss
2 nl d NO26
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money demand.  In any event, consistent with theory, the estimated coefficient on 
for these days is equal but opposite in sign to that of reserve demand shocks. 
miss
Finally, the model was estimated over the period August 3, 1998, through January 
30, 2004.  It is important to note that  tt BR IBA  ,
D
t err , and   are not available over this 
period, so the estimates are likely to be biased.  More importantly, because the 
introduction of lagged reserve accounting effectively severed the contemporaneous 
relationship between money and reserve demand, estimates of the daily liquidity effect 
have no implication for the policy-relevant liquidity effect.  The estimate for other than 
the last two days of the maintenance period when there were no outliers is   and 
statistically significant at a very low significance level.  This estimate shows that the 




The daily liquidity effect was first investigated by Hamilton (1997) in an attempt 
to find evidence of Friedman’s (1969) policy-relevant liquidity effect that had escaped 
detection using lower frequency, monthly and quarterly, data.  The daily liquidity effect 
is directly linked to the policy-relevant liquidity effect by Federal-Reserve-imposed 
reserve requirements.  This paper analyzed the relationship between the policy-relevant 
and daily liquidity effects using a comprehensive model of the Desk’s operating 
procedure.  The analysis shows that the relationship between the daily and policy-
relevant liquidity effects depends on the Desk’s operating procedure, the Fed’s system of 
reserve requirements, and other factors.  Importantly, the analysis shows that there is no 
relationship between these liquidity effects after July 1998 when the Fed reinstated 
4. Conclusions 27
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lagged reserve accounting. 
Estimates of the model using data before 1994 suggest that there may have been a 
statistically significant policy-relevant liquidity effect prior to 1994.  The estimated daily 
liquidity effect is small, however.  For example, according to this estimate it would take 
roughly a $10 billion reserve supply shock to generate about a 20-basis-point change in 
the funds rate.  If one assumes that the average effective reserve requirement during this 
period is 10 percent, this would be equivalent to about a $100 billion shock to the money 
supply.  Because banks have an incentive to economize on their holdings of reserves, 
reserve demand is interest sensitive after the Fed reinstated lagged reserve accounting in 
July 1998.  Estimates of a statistically significant daily liquidity effect after July 1998, 
reported here and elsewhere, however, have no implications for the policy-relevant 
liquidity effect.  They merely confirm the interest sensitivity of reserve demand. 
The analysis presented here suggests that it is no easier to find convincing proof 
of a statistically significant and economically important policy-relevant liquidity effect 
using high-frequency daily data than it has been using lower frequency (monthly and 
quarterly) data.  A resolution of the liquidity puzzle remains elusive. 28
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